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Legal Writing:
The View From Within
by J. Christopher Rideout"
and Jill J. Ramsfield'"
"[Wiriting is an act of identity ......
We have seen that law professors systematically focus their students'
attention on layers of textual and legal authority when deciphering the
conflict stories at the heart of legal cases. But what happens to the
people in these stories? What aspects of their identities and lives
remain important when refracted through this legal lens? We can ask
as well: What aspects of the law students' and professors' lives and
experiences are considered to be salient during the conversation?2
Why is writing hard to do? For lots of reasons, most people would say.
But if pressed, the majority would acknowledge that among those
reasons, writing in general is hard to do because your self is on the line
when you write. Writing is an act of self-expression and, in turn, self-
revelation. Writing involves the self. At the mention of this idea, people
almost always nod their heads in agreement.
So why is legal writing hard to do? Most people would acknowledge
that legal writing can indeed be challenging, especially doing it well,
again for a number of different reasons. Many of those reasons would
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be what we call text-based: legal writing is difficult because, among
other things, it requires the mastery of a number of discourse conven-
tions-some of them complex, many of them constraining, and many of
them unfamiliar to beginning legal writers.
Another way to approach the question is to keep in mind the
relationship between writing and thinking. If "thinking like a lawyer,"
the purported goal of legal education, is complex and challenging to
master, then "writing like a lawyer" must, to some extent, be equally
challenging. Although a little more vague, this seems like a good reason
for legal writing being similarly difficult.
Much further down the list of reasons for legal writing being
difficult-if on the list at all-would be that legal writing involves
questions of the writer's self. But we think otherwise. In fact, we
believe that questions of the self are one of the reasons why legal writing
is such a challenging type of discourse to write and especially to write
well. And we further believe that for beginning legal writers, questions
of the self are primary and are one of the central challenges. We also
know that at first blush, this sounds unlikely. But that is because, when
people talk about a writer's self, they usually have in mind notions of
the self that we do not.
When people talk about a writer's self, they commonly think of an
essentialist, or expressivist, or even a romantic notion of the self.' A
writer's self is a kind of individual's core from which ideas, arguments,
feelings, and attitudes emerge. This is not unlike how people think of
their "self" generally-as something stable, unitary, coherent, and
"theirs."4
In our view-what might be called "the view from within"-a writer's
self is something different from these commonsense notions of the self.5
Although there is a way in which a legal writer brings a self to the
writing task, that self becomes only one part of the self that is in the
legal document. In other ways, the legal document, or rather the legal
discourse within which the document is situated, also contributes to and
constructs that self. For these reasons, upon which we will elaborate
3. Romantic in this sense means that the self is the source of ideas and inspiration for
the writer. For a discussion of this in the poetic tradition, one that spills over into general
cultural notions of the writer's self, see M.H. ABRAMS, THE MIRROR AND THE LAMP:
ROMANTIC THEORY AND THE CRITICAL TRADITION 77 (1953).
4. See generally STEPHEN M. FELDMAN, AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT FROM PREMODERN-
ISM TO POSTMODERNISM 174 (2000); PIERRE SCHLAG, THE ENCHANTMENT OF REASON 127
(1998).
5. We will sidestep any discussion of the "self' generally, although we have ideas about
that as well.
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later in this Article, we think it is best to view the self, or identity, of a
legal writer as a discoursal identity.6
In offering this view of a legal writer's identity, we are elaborating on
and extending what we described in an earlier article as the social view
of legal writing-a view that we consider important to a full understand-
ing of what law students and lawyers do when they write in legal
contexts.7 Before we turn, then, to the discoursal identity of legal
writers, we need to review and comment on the social view of legal
writing generally.
I. A REVISED VIEW REVISITED
A. Contexts for Legal Writing
In our earlier article, we reviewed and criticized what we considered
traditional but incomplete views of legal writing.8 Rather than seeing
writing as something you can either do or not do, a "skill" divorced from
intellectual activity, or a necessary evil in the law curriculum, we
suggested seeing legal writing as legal thinking itself.9 Professors,
jurists, lawyers, and law students write their livings, so to speak. And
legal writing is, of course, the written law itself, not to be taken lightly.
In fact, legal writing requires attention and study by experts in a range
of fields, including linguistics, anthropology, sociology, and rhetoric.
Such studies are emerging, and they help legal writers and professors
of legal writing to see themselves anew.1°
We suggested a richer vision of teaching law and legal writing, one
that included primarily three views: the formalist, process, and social
perspectives.' These theories, derived from work by composition
6. We take the phrase discoursal identity from Roz Ivani6. See IVANI6, supra note 1,
at 25. We first encountered her work at a conference on knowledge and discourse in Hong
Kong in 2002, and her work has greatly influenced our own thinking since we attended
that conference.
7. See J. Christopher Rideout & Jill J. Ramsfield, Legal Writing: A Revised View, 69
WASH. L. REV. 35, 56-58, 61, 67 (1994).
8. Id. at 39.
9. Id. at 54-55.
10. See MERTz, supra note 2; JOHN SWALES, GENRE ANALYSIs (1993); Dorothy H.
Evensen, To Group or Not to Group: Students' Perceptions of Collaborative Learning
Activities in Law School, 28 S. ILL. U. L.J. 343 (2004); Laurie C. Kadoch, Legal Writing:
The Third Paradigm: Bringing Legal Writing "Out of the Box" and Into the Mainstream:
A Marriage of Doctrinal Subject Matter and Legal Writing Doctrine, 13 J. LEGAL WRITING
INST. 55 (2007).
11. Rideout & Ramsfield, supra note 7, at 48-61.
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theorists and linguists,"2 suggest that legal writing is the embodiment
of the analytical and intellectual work of all writers within the legal
community: students, scholars, and practitioners. 3 As such, legal
writing requires complex analysis, challenging to the individual writer
at any level:
[L]aw school offers an invitation into one of the richest and most
complex of the professional discourses: a community that is demanding
in its argumentative and analytical paradigms, challenging in its
research and writing processes, and complicated by its social pressures.
Such a complex discourse and its accompanying social contexts require
strategies for discovering and mastering its conventions, for writing as
a situated member of the legal community. The legal writing classroom
should, appropriately, initiate students into these conventions and
practices. And that process of initiation should continue through the
three years."
Such strategies include awareness of all three perspectives: the
formalist perspective offers techniques for discovering the textual
boundaries of legal discourse; the process perspective offers techniques
for mastering research and analytical tasks required by each project; and
the social perspective offers techniques for analyzing a document's
context and the bases for individual writers' design decisions. Working
together, these perspectives enrich the law classroom, initiating students
into the legal discourse community-an approach embodied in what we
called the "social view" of legal writing:
In certain ways, the social perspective has a kinship with traditional
views of legal education. For example, a common assumption is that
law school teaches students to "think like a lawyer." In other words,
through their three-year exposure to law casebooks and oral question-
ing in class, students will be molded into lawyers. The social perspec-
tive allows for a similar view of writing. As Lester Faigley explains,
writing "shapes the writer as much as it is shaped by the writer." In
other words, to learn legal writing is to learn how to write within the
conventions and practices of a particular professional group more than
it is to write original ideas that the law might then claim as its own,
12. See, e.g., ENGLISH FOR ACADEMIC PURPOSES (A.P. Cowie & J.B. Heaton eds., 1977);
Anne J. Herrington, Writing in Academic Settings: A Study of the Contexts for Writing in
Two College Chemical Engineering Courses, 19 RES. TEACHING ENG. 331, 356-57 (1985);
Ann M. Johns & Tony Dudley-Evans, English for Specific Purposes: International in Scope,
Specific in Purpose, 25 TESOL Q. 297, 297, 304-05 (1991); Joseph M. Williams, On the
Maturing of Legal Writers: Two Models of Growth and Development, 1 J. LEGAL WRITING
INST. 1, 2, 13 (1991).
13. Rideout & Ramsfield, supra note 7, at 99.
14. Id.
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as being "legal." This seeming loss of the ability to "be original" is
something every law student encounters. Indeed, most writers- in all
fields-make a commonplace assumption that, when they write, they
are constructing original ideas that represent their own individual
thinking. Thus, law students are frustrated by what they see as the
lack of "creativity" in legal writing and analysis. In fact, they are
learning to write within a highly conventionalized discourse, law, in
which legal arguments are constructed according to certain unwritten
discourse rules, or conventions. Because of their unfamiliarity with
those conventions, law students are unable to see the creativity
afforded them within the conventions, for example in constructing legal
arguments. 5
All of this meant students and faculty needed to be aware that
learning and performance needed to be put into a context.
B. Impact of the Formalist, Process, and Social Perspectives
Legal educators have adopted all three perspectives. Ostensibly
leaving behind the formalist perspective, legal writing faculty have
embraced both the process and social perspectives in the legal writing
classroom. Seeing writing as a "process of making meaning,"6 profes-
sors have begun to create curricula built around the writing process,
giving students opportunities to explore stages in the legal writing
process and to see professors as mere interveners in that process. 7
The number of courses requiring rewrites of an assignment, for example,
continues to increase steadily" as professors encourage recursive
15. Id. at 59-60 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Lester Faigley, Nonacademic Writing: The
Social Perspective, in WRITING IN NONACADEMIC SETTINGS 231, 236 (Lee Odell & Dixie
Goswamie eds., 1985)).
16. Susan L. DeJarnatt, Law Talk: Speaking, Writing, and Entering the Discourse of
Law, 40 DUQ. L. REV. 489, 492 (2002); see also Adam Todd, Neither Dead Nor Dangerous:
Postmodernism and the Teaching of Legal Writing, 58 BAYLOR L. REV. 893, 919-20 (2006).
17. See generally Ellie Margolis & Susan L. DeJarnatt, Moving Beyond Product to
Process: Building a Better LRW Program, 46 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 93 (2005) (commenting
on the development of legal writing curriculum from an emphasis on the product of writing
to the process of writing); Jo Anne Durako et al., From Product to Process: Evolution of a
Legal Writing Program, 58 U. PriT. L. REV. 719 (1997) (discussing the process approach
as the newest method in legal writing theory); Laurie C. Kadoch, The Third Paradigm:
Bringing Legal Writing "Out of the Box" and Into the Mainstream: A Marriage of Doctrinal
Subject Matter and Legal Writing Doctrine, 13 J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 55, 62 (2007)
(describing the early transition from product focused results to the new emerging paradigm
shifting the emphasis to process); Cara Cunningham & Michelle Streicher, The
Methodology of Persuasian: A Process-Based Approach to Persuasive Writing, 13 J. LEGAL
WRITING INST. 159, 163 (2007) (showing the relationship between persuasion and process).
18. The Legal Writing Institute administers annual surveys to document critical data
in legal writing curriculum. From these surveys, in the years 2000-2009, there was a
HeinOnline  -- 61 Mercer L. Rev. 709 2009-2010
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techniques and a variety of approaches to designing and building legal
documents.
The adaptation of the social view was steady and strong. Seen at first
as the simple recognition that students are becoming members of a
profession 9 in which legal thinking and legal writing are insepara-
ble,2" some proponents suggested that the legal writing classroom
should be small,2 focused on individual instruction, 2 postmodern, 23
and generative.' But those modest suggestions, sometimes stated in
the context of arguing for a vast change in legal education, evolved into
a more holistic view of how to teach legal writing.
The holistic view requires that all legal writing be put in a larger
context and that students be taught not just the nuts and bolts of legal
language, or a healthy approach to producing a document, but a strong
sense of rhetorical setting. The community is not monolithic but,
instead, specific.' And the specific characteristics are available to all
those entering the community-whether for analysis, discussion,
criticism, acceptance, or rejection. Any nonlawyer recognizes that
lawyers have their own discourse; any student entering the community
is expected to, and expects to, learn about that discourse.
fourteen percent increase in schools requiring rewrites for all major assignments. See
Legal Writing Institute Surveys, available at http'/www.lwionline.org/surveys.html (last
visited Apr. 20, 2010).
19. John F. Nivala, The Architecture of a Lawyer's Operation, 20 J. LEGAL PROF. 99,
100, 117 (1996); Matthew J. Arnold, Comment, The Lack of Basic Writing Skills and Its
Impact on the Legal Profession, 24 CAP. U. L. REV. 227, 229 (1995). See generally Suzanne
E. Rowe, Legal Research, Legal Writing, and Legal Analysis: Putting Law School Into
Practice, 29 STETSON L. REV. 1193 (2000); Kathleen Elliot Vinson, Improving Legal Writing:
A Life-Long Learning Process and Continuing Professional Challenge, 21 TOURO L. REV.
507 (2005).
20. Lucia Ann Silecchia, Legal Skills Training in the First Year of Law School:
Research? Writing? Analysis? Or More?, 100 DICK. L. REV. 245, 254-55 (1996).
21. Robin A. Boyle & Rita Dunn, Teaching Law Students Through Individual Learning
Styles, 62 ALB. L. REV. 213, 213, 234 (1998); see also Julie A. Oseid, It Happened To Me:
Sharing Personal Value Dilemmas To Teach Professionalism and Ethics, 12 J. LEGAL
WRITING INST. 105, 115 (2006); Dionne L. Koller, Legal Writing and Academic Support:
Timing Is Everything, 53 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 51, 62 (2006).
22. See Ruta K. Stropus, Mend It, Bend It, and Extend It: The Fate of Traditional Law
School Methodology in the 21st Century, 27 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 449, 481-82 (1996); see also
Evensen, supra note 10, at 353-54; Robin S. Wellford-Slocum, The Law School Student-
Faculty Conference: Towards a Transformative Learning Experience, 45 S. TEX. L. REV. 255,
262-71 (2004).
23. Adam Todd, Neither Dead nor Dangerous: Postmodernism and the Teaching of Legal
Writing, 58 BAYLOR L. REV. 893, 911, 915-17, 920, 945 (2006).
24. See, e.g., Philip C. Kissam, The Ideology of the Case Method/Final Examination
Law School, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 137, 156 (2001).
25. DeJarnatt, supra note 16, at 492.
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Seeing the social view in the broader context for legal education, legal
writing professors have inevitably embraced conventions, restrictions,
rules, and directions, exhorting the need to conform to the community,
follow traditions, and fit within restrictive notions of how law does, or
should, work.' This has had an impact, at times, that was unintended
by our previous article.
The trouble is the professor's stance. If the professor uses the social
view as a tool for indoctrination only,' for acculturation only, or for a
thinly guised return to formalism, the subtleties and strengths of the
view are lost. One commentator observed these unintended consequenc-
es by suggesting that the social view was, in fact, elitist,' which it
certainly could be if misunderstood or wrongly applied. Unwittingly,
enthusiasts of the social view may have created an "us versus them"
perspective that looks more like the current traditional paradigm than
a generative one: more static, less fluid; more exclusive, less inclusive;
more permanent, and less negotiable.' While the social view helps
legal writing teachers understand why "experienced writers who have
done well in other discourse communities can be so terribly disconcerted
when they shift into the discourse community of legal writing with its
new rules, conventions, purposes, and audiences,"30 that view can also
suggest an "expert-novice divide, the initiation rituals that reinforce that
divide, and the idea of fully realized, merely to-be-learned conven-
tions." 1 The fact is, "discourse communities are built and maintained
by power structures,"32 and the ideas of "initiating" rather than
"inviting" and having "experts" train novices are by definition "more
ominous and more hierarchical"33 than generative and productive.
26. See generally Lisa Eichhorn, Writing in the Legal Academy: A Dangerous
Supplement?, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 105, 112-13, 118, 120-21, 123, 126-27, 130, 133-34, 136-39
(1998); Marie A. Monahan, Towards a Theory of Assimilating Law Students into the
Culture of the Legal Profession, 51 CATH. U. L. REv. 215, 216-17 (2001); Stephen P. Witte,
Context, Text, Intertext: Toward a Constructivist Semiotic of Writing, 9 WRITEN COMM.
237, 246, 252-53, 263, 271, 283, 290-92 (1992).
27. See Brook K. Baker, Language Acculturation Processes and Resistance to
In'doctrine"ation in the Legal Skills Curriculum and Beyond: A Commentary on Mertz's
Critical Anthropology of the Socratic, Doctrinal Classroom, 34 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 131,
131-32, 139 (2000).
28. See Jessie C. Grearson, Teaching the Transitions, 4 J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 57,
67-68 (1998).
29. See id. at 59-60.
30. Id. at 69.
31. Id. at 70.
32. Id. at 71.
33. See id. at 70-71.
2010]
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Taken too far, the social view can do more harm than good, both to
writers' identities and to their openness to learning. Used improperly,
the social view can be a kind of educational hypocrisy:
We cannot simply mention in passing that students come to legal
writing with their own expertise, and then treat this expertise as a
stumbling block, an explanation for students' incompetence at and
discomfort with legal writing. lb do so not only frustrates students but
it ignores a real possibility: students as potential agents for review and
possible reform of legal writing conventions."
Instead, the social view can liberate the classroom and the writer by
helping both professor and student discover their places in a complex
discourse. Indeed, two commentators have championed the social view
as a helpful stage in the legal classroom's evolution."5 According to
them, the work of the New Rhetoricians and the social constructivists
has opened the law classroom in general, and the legal writing classroom
in particular, to a broader context for learners, a greater range of
rhetorical awareness, and an increased repertoire of approaches and
techniques suited to legal writing, whether academic or practical.36
Seeing "writing [as] a process for constructing thought, not just [as]
the 'skin' that covers thought,"3 7 New Rhetoricians saw writing as a
series of choices within the context of legal problem solving.' Thus
writing is a "knowledge-shaping process," an interaction among "reader,
writer, and text, all of which are embedded in context and language. " 9
"[N]o longer viewed as the mere transcription of thought"-something
predetermined and resolved-writing is an "active way of making
meaning,' ° a "process of coming to know."
34. Id. at 72.
35. Linda L. Berger, Applying New Rhetoric to Legal Discourse: The Ebb and Flow of
Reader and Writer, Text and Context, 49 J. LEGAL EDUC. 155, 155 (1999); DeJarnatt, supra
note 16, at 489.
36. Berger, supra note 35, at 164-65; DeJarnatt, supra note 16, at 489, 503.
37. Berger, supra note 35, at 155 (citing ANNE. BERTHOFF, THE MAKING OF MEANING:
METAPHORS, MODELS, AND MAXIMS FOR WRITING TEACHERS 69 (1981)).
38. Id. (citing JANET EMIG, THE WEB OF MEANING: ESSAYS ON WRITING, TEACHING,
LEARNING AND THINKING 4 (Dixie Goswami & Maureen Butler eds., 1983); LINDA FLOWER,
THE CONSTRUCTION OF NEGOTIATED MEANING: A SOCIAL COGNITIVE THEORY OF WRITING
2 (1994); Maxine Hairston, The Winds of Change: Thomas Kuhn and the Revolution in the
Teaching of Writing, 33 C. COMPOSITION & COMM. 76, 85 (1982)).
39. Id. at 157.
40. DeJarnatt, supra note 16, at 495.
41. Id. at 494 (citing C.H. KNOBLAUCH & LIL BRANNON, RHETORICAL TRADITIONS AND
THE TEACHING OF WRITING 51 (1984)).
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Professors learned to ask the right questions. Students, in turn,
learned how to ask similar questions in the context of any legal writing
experience: Who are the audiences for this document? Who will use it?
What are their needs and expectations? What is the document's
overriding purpose? What are its subsidiary purposes? What is the
appropriate scope for achieving these purposes and reaching these
audiences? What is the appropriate balance among these rhetorical
elements? And from what point of view are these purposes best
achieved? Like an architectural puzzle, legal writing can be seen as best
designed when it fits into the intellectual and practical landscapes where
it will be used.4
Seen by some as an inner-directed process so fundamental as to be
universal,' some who adopted the social view helped individual writers
discover their most comfortable place within the discourse community,
to negotiate into the community from their particular points of view, and
to develop techniques and methods most useful to their specific points
of progress into the community. Seen by others as outer-directed, some
who adopted the social view believed that "'thinking and language use
can never occur free of a social context that conditions them"'" and that
knowledge is therefore a "'social construction."'48 While this notion in
itself does not have to trap its adherents, it could create an undue
enthusiasm for the community's demands at the cost of the individual's
writing process, knowledge, or point of view. Misunderstood or taken too
far, the social view could rank legal discourse as "superior to the
student's personal voice" or could overemphasize "the community as
exclusive, making the teacher once again the gatekeeper with power to
42. For a more detailed exploration of how this intellectual architecture can work, see
Jill J. Ramsfield, THE LAW AS ARCHITECTURE: BUILDING LEGAL DOCUMENTS (2000).
43. Berger, supra note 35, at 158 (quoting Patricia Bizzell, Cognition, Convention, and
Certainty: What We Need to Know About Writing, 3 PREfrEXT 213, 215 (1982)).
44. Id. (quoting Bizzell, supra note 43, at 217).
45. Id. (quoting JAMES A. BERLIN, RHETORIC AND REALITY: WRITING INSTRUCTION IN
AMERICAN COLLEGES, 1900-1985, at 175 (1987)). Berger also writes as follows:
Rather than an outgrowth of New Rhetoric, social construction can be viewed as
a countertheory. One author describes the beginning of New Rhetoric research in
the early 1970s as a turning point in composition theory. At that point, the field
turned away from "questions of value and the figure of the writer in a social
context of writing to questions of process and the figure of the writer as an
individual psychology."... The "displacement of the social and... celebration of
the individual". .. runs through all the subsequent strains of composition theory,
research, and curriculum development.
Id. at 158 n.23 (second alteration in original) (quoting David Bartholomae, Writing with
Teachers: A Conversation with Peter Elbow, 46 C. COMPOSITION & COMM. 62, 68 (1995)).
46. See DeJarnatt, supra note 16, at 503.
20101 713
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exclude. 47 This "once again" approach returns law professors to the
current traditional paradigm where texts are "univocal and autonomous,
standing alone and meaningful independent of the text's context or of its
writer's intent or background.' Students are empty vessels, and
teachers fill them up. Power points are memorized and regurgitated,
forms are learned and aped, and writing is mechanical and divorced
from process or personal choice.
Some theorists found room in the social view for both inner-directed
and outer-directed activity, an epistemological approach that liberated
both teacher and learner. For example, Linda Flower has suggested a
"pedagogy of literate action" that would bring together the social,
cognitive, and rhetorical strands and focus on the writer "as an agent
within a social and rhetorical context."49 Flower writes that a literate
action is "a socially embedded, socially shaped practice," and at the same
time, "an individual constructive act that embeds practices and
conventions within its own personally meaningful, goal-directed use of
literacy," and because it is both social and individual, "a site of conflict
among multiple goals, alternative goods, and opposing shoulds [that]
calls for negotiation among unavoidable constraints, options, and
alternatives.' 5° This approach recognizes the power and place of
negotiating meaning between individuals and the community and
between novices and experts.
The trouble is that the learner may have gotten lost. Using the social
view, professors may have let community trump critical thinking,
discourse drum out dialogue, and context coerce creativity.
C. A Revised View of the Writer
We never intended such a result. In fact, we warned that legal
writers needed to negotiate several social settings, be aware of ever-
changing circumstances, and understand the points of view derived from
a variety of backgrounds, each of which might determine a specific path
into the community.
The social perspective allows for other writing difficulties that law
students and lawyers may encounter as well. For example, they are
situated in several social settings at once. They are working within the
47. See id. at 505.
48. Id. at 499 (citing Martin Nystrand et al., Where Did Composition Studies Come
From?, 10 WRrrTEN COMM. 267, 275, 277-78 (1993)); see Rideout & Ramsfield, supra note
7, at 49-50.
49. Linda Flower, Literate Action, in COMPosmON IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY:
CRISIS AND CHANGE 249, 249 (Lynn Z. Bloom et al. eds., 1996).
50. Id.
714 [Vol. 61
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law office and law school communities, whose members are making
various and changing demands on the writer. They are usually also
working within the larger legal community, whose members have set
ethical and practice standards. And they come from different gender,
race, and ethnic communities that may generate different learning
styles and perspectives."'
The social perspective reveals common matters members have as part
of the community, which can ostensibly erase the individual characteris-
tics or psychology of each member. The constraints and demands of the
community are shaping her as she learns and attempts to negotiate her
way into the community. By definition, such a negotiation will be met
with resistance, confusion, rebellion, and perhaps despair. The social
perspective taught us to look at the larger context within which writers
performed and negotiated meaning to see that writing is a social act.
But is the social view getting us far enough as thus explored, used, and
explained? Evidently not.
We need to see the view from within: the clashes within the legal
discourse community reveal unresolved approaches to teaching; the
clashes within individual writers reveal unexplored possibilities. Our
students arrive at law school talented, smart, and wise in many ways.
They bring with them analytical and creative tools more than adequate
to meet the needs of modern legal academia and practice. In a way, they
are like gifted athletes-adept at basketball, football, soccer, or track.
They are asked to switch to an individual sport, for example tennis, to
develop athleticism in a personal performance against one adversary,
which sometimes occurs on a grander, more public stage. We as
teachers put them on the courts, tell them the rules, and expect them
(usually in one year) to be virtuosi tennis stars. Funny, they aren't. Yet
we rail against them, not against ourselves. "We've told you to stop
playing basketball. Why haven't you? Play tennis!" But they cannot
adjust immediately because this is a different way of being. Now we
need to look at how that different way of being is actually experienced
by the writers. By doing so, we may be able to discover a more balanced
approach, not just to the legal writing classroom, but also to all law
classrooms. We need a way of analyzing what happens to these students
when they try to become insiders, a way of remodeling the classroom to
suit those experiences.
Most law professors would probably like such a remodeling. The
literature is rife with complaints about legal education and theories
51. Rideout & Ramsfield, supra note 7, at 61.
2010] 715
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about why students cannot perform better than they do. And those
complaints are not limited to law schools:
Institutions of higher education are full of complaints about student
writing. The mismatch between students' writing and institutional
expectations is frequently attributed to a literacy deficit on the part of
the students. The most common response is to set up some sort of 'fix-
it' study skills provision with the aim of remedying this irritating
literacy deficit as quickly and cheaply as possible. My research has led
me to see this mismatch in a quite different light, and to propose that
academic institutions, in addition to providing the sort of support
recommended in the previous section, ought themselves to be examin-
ing and remedying their own practices.52
Legal writing literature abounds in similar frustrations: the Socratic
method is outmoded and students respond poorly;' students do not
interact well in class;"4 the law classroom is anti-feminist" and
largely immune from efforts to make it more class conscious, 6 race con-
scious,57 culture conscious," or international.59  Students are unpre-
52. IVANIO, supra note 1, at 343.
53. Cynthia G. Hawkins-Le6n, The Socratic Method-Problem Method Dichotomy: The
Debate Over Teaching Method Continues, 1998 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 1, 16-17; see Orin S.
Kerr, The Decline of the Socratic Method at Harvard, 78 NEB. L. REv. 113, 114-16, 118,
120-22, 127 (1999); Stropus, supra note 22, at 456-65; James B. Levy, As a Last Resort,
Ask the Students: What They Say Makes Someone an Effective Law Teacher, 58 ME. L. REV.
49, 54 (2006); see also Jeffrey D. Jackson, Socrates and Langdell in Legal Writing: Is the
Socratic Method A Proper Tool for Legal Writing Courses?, 43 CAL. W. L. REV. 267 (2007).
54. See Evenson, supra note 10, at 378-79.
55. See Kathryn M. Stanchi, Resistance Is Futile: How Legal Writing Pedagogy
Contributes to the Law's Marginalization of Outsider Voices, 103 DIcK. L. REV. 7, 16-22
(1998); Cheryl M. Herden, Women in Legal Education: A Feminist Analysis of Law School,
63 REv. JuR. U.P.R. 551 (1994); Tanisha Makeba Bailey, The Master's Tools: Deconstructing
The Socratic Method and It's Disparate Impact On Women Through The Prism of Equal
Protection Doctrine, 3 MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 125 (2003); Felice Batlan
et al., Not Our Mother's Law School?:A Third-Wave Feminist Study of Women's Experiences
in Law School, 39 U. BALT. L.F. 124 (2009); but see Kenneth Lasson, Feminism Awry:
Excesses in The Pursuit of Rights and Trifles, 42 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1, 2 (1992).
56. See Baker, supra note 27, at 135; Brook K. Baker, Transcending Legacies of Literacy
and Transforming the Traditional Repertoire: Critical Discourse Strategies for Practice, 23
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 491, 561 (1997); Lucille A. Jewel, Bourdieu and American Legal
Education: How Law Schools Reproduce Social Stratification and Class Hierarchy, 56
BUFF. L. REV. 1155 (2008).
57. See Kimberld Williams Crenshaw, Foreword: Toward a Race-Conscious Pedagogy
in Legal Education, 4 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 33, 39 (1994).
58. While much of the critical race and feminist literature brings the stories of
individuals into the legal discourse community, this literature often focuses on individuals
as outsiders to the dominant community rather than travelers moving successfully from
one community to another. See Baker, supra note 27, at 315; Baker, supra note 56, at 561;
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pared' and alienated and more preoccupied with getting the grades
than learning the law.6 Lawyers, in turn, find students unprepared
for the practice of law and generally more mercenary than motivated. 2
And despite these complaints, no literature, including the discussions on
novices and experts," has solved this alienation problem. Some
literature frames the situation in somewhat helpful but perhaps overly
simplistic ways: as a series of lesson plans, including peer work and
reflective reading or an exhortation to use study groups more
consciously.' On the other hand, some suggest a complete revamping
of the case method approach and Socratic teaching," while others stand
Crenshaw, supra note 57, at 39.
59. See Jill J. Ramsfield, Is -Logic- Culturally Based? A Contrastive, International
Approach to the U.S. Law Classroom, 47 J. LEGAL EDUC. 157, 157-58 (1997).
60. Cathaleen A. Roach, Is the Sky Falling? Ruminations on Incoming Law Student
Preparedness (and Implications for the Profession) in the Wake of Recent National and
Other Reports, 11 J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 295, 295-96, 300 (2005); Jason M. Dolin,
Opportunity Lost: How Law School Disappoints Law Students, The Public, and the Legal
Profession, 44 CAL. W. L. REV. 219,236-38 (2007); Benjamin V. Madison 1H, The Elephant
in Law School Classrooms: Overuse of the Socratic Method As An Obstacle To Teaching
Modern Law Students, 85 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 293, 298 (2008).
61. See Ann Althouse, A Skull Full of Mush, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 20, 2007, at A19,
available at http-J/select.nytimes.com/2007/02/20/opinion/20althose.html?_r=l; see also
Evensen, supra note 10, at 367-68, 371; Barbara Glesner Fines, Competition and the
Curve, 65 UMKC L. REV. 879 (1997).
62. See Debra Cassens Weiss, Summer Associates Advised to Lose the Sense of
Entitlement, A.B.A. J., Apr. 28, 2009, http'//www.abajournal.com/news/article/summer_
associates..advised_to_losethesense_of_entitlement; see also Dolin, supra note 60, at
236-38.
63. The novice-expert literature describes novices and experts but fails to connect one
to the other, particularly in terms of teaching methodology and individual progress. See,
e.g., Gary L. Blasi, What Lawyers Know: Lawyering Expertise, Cognitive Science, and the
Functions of Theory, 45 J. LEGAL EDUC. 313, 314-16 (1995).
64. Berger, supra note 35, at 177-81 (offering tips for reflective reading through
individual and group stages of review).
65. Evenson, supra note 10, at 419.
66. See, e.g., Tanisha Makeba Bailey, The Master's Tools: Deconstructing the Socratic
Method and Its Disparate Impact on Women Through the Prism of the Equal Protection
Doctrine, 3 MARGINs 125, 163 (2003) (arguing against the Socratic method based on equal
protection); David D. Garner, Socratic Misogyny?-Analyzing Feminist Criticisms of
Socratic Teaching in Legal Education, 2000 BYU L. REV. 1597, 1634-48 (providing a
modification of the Socratic method to accommodate feminist criticisms while maintaining
the method's benefits); Hawkins-Le6n, supra note 53, at 2 (arguing for a combined Socratic
and Problem method, with focus given to the Problem method); Kerr, supra note 53, at 114
(concluding the traditional Socratic-method style is no longer the norm in legal education);
see also Boyle & Dunn, supra note 21, at 219-20; Kara Abramson, 'Art For A Better Life:"
A New Image of American Legal Education, 2006 B.Y.U. EDUC. & L.J. 227 (2006); John 0.
Sonsteng, et al.,A Legal Education Renaissance:A Practical Approach For the Twenty.First
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firm on current methodology, from Socratic method to a ban on
laptops.67
No singular panacea will remedy legal education, but we may find
part of the solution closer than our hands and feet: within the learners
themselves. What we have discovered since we wrote our earlier article
is that a whole other group has looked at the social perspective view
through the idea of "literacies," taking academic education a step further
by looking not only at what the writer does, but also at who the writer
is. Similarly, we suspect that one key to improving our practices in legal
education is to understand who the writer is in the law classroom, how
the legal writer is positioned in the legal discourse community, and what
the legal writer's possibilities are for constructing an identity within that
discourse. That is, we encourage taking the view from within-a view
of the self of a legal writer. But getting there requires starting from the
outside-from the social perspective and its linkage with academic
literacy.
II. LEGAL WRITING AND IDENTITY
A. Academic Literacies
Our additional thinking emerges from what is called "new literacy
studies,"6s a movement that is centered in the United Kingdom,
although American researchers have also made contributions.69 Its
Century, 34 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 303 (2007).
67. David Cole, Laptops vs. Learning, WASH. POST, Apr. 7, 2007, at A3, available at
httpA/www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/contentarticle/2007/04/06/AR2007040601544.html
(citing a Georgetown University law professor's prohibition of laptops in class because
students were less engaged and transcribed lectures without processing the information);
see also Kathy Matheson, More Professors Ban Laptops in Class, AssOC. PRESS, May 3,
2006, available at http-//www.msnbc.msn.com/id/12609580 (reporting on the banning of
laptops because of the distraction they cause); see also Michael Vitiello, Professor
Kingsfield: The Most Misunderstood Character In Literature, 33 HOFSTSRA L. REV. 955
(2005) (arguing that the Socratic method forces students to engage in legal analysis and
compels students to overcome the fear necessary to becoming an effective lawyer); Jana R.
McCreary, The Laptop-Free Zone, 43 VAL. U. L. REV. 989 (2009) (examining the question
of whether students should be permitted to use laptops in class).
68. See, e.g., SITUATED LITERACIES: READING AND WRITING IN CONTEXT 1-2,5-6 (David
Barton et al. eds., 2000); see also DAVID BARTON, LITERACY: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
ECOLOGY OF WRITTEN LANGUAGE (1994); MIKE BAYNHAM, LITERACY PRACTICES 1, 265
(1995); BRIAN V. STREET, LITERACY IN THEORY AND PRACTICE (1984); BRIAN V. STREET,
SOCIAL LITERACIES: CRITICAL APPROACHES TO LITERACY IN DEVELOPMENT, ETHNOGRAPHY
AND EDUCATION 1 (1995).
69. See, e.g., JAMES PAUL GEE, SOCIAL LINGUISTICS AND LITERACIES: IDEOLOGY IN
DISCOURSES (2d ed. 1996); JAMES PAUL GEE, THE SOCIAL MIND: LANGUAGE, IDEOLOGY, AND
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primary feature is to look at literacy as a social practice.70 In doing so,
new literacy researchers examine the link between the activities of
reading and writing, on the one hand, and the contexts and social
structures in which those activities are embedded and which, in turn,
shape those activities, on the other.7 For this reason, these research-
ers commonly call the literacies that they study "situated literacies."72
By looking at literacy as a social practice, these researchers inevitably
examine the ways in which reading and writing practices are structured
and sustained by the institutions that are part of the social context
within which they take place; thus, these researchers in turn focus as
well on the power relationships embedded within those institutions.7 3
Because some of the institutions that structure various literacy practices
are more powerful socially or culturally, it follows that some literacy
practices are more "dominant, visible and influential than others."74 In
the view of most new literacy researchers, one of the more powerful
social institutions is that of education, and so not surprisingly, literacy
as it is taught in schools is one primary area of research.75
Mary Lea and Brian Street have extended this inquiry into higher
education, giving the label "academic literacies" to the kinds of writing
and reading in which students engage in various disciplines.76 Lea and
Street characterize learning in higher education as a matter of "adapting
to new ways of knowing."77 This perspective sounds similar to what is
often considered "learning the conventions of a new discipline,"7s or
SOCIAL PRACTICE (1992).
70. See David Barton & Mary Hamilton, Literacy Practices, in SITUATED L1TERACIES,
supra note 68, at 7, 7.
71. Id.
72. See id. at 8.
73. See id.
74. Id. at 12 (emphasis omitted).
75. But this is not the exclusive area of research. Various authors investigate literacy
practices in other contexts. See Mary Hamilton, Expanding the New Literacy Studies, in
SITUATED LITERACIES, supra note 68, at 16, 16 (visual data in social research); Kathryn
Jones, Becoming Just Another Alphanumeric Code, in SITUATED LITERACIES, supra note 68,
at 70, 70-71 (Welsh farming communities); Karin Tusting, The New Literacy Studies, in
SITUATED LITERAcIEs, supra note 68, at 35, 43 (religious practice of communion); Anita
Wilson, There is No Escape from Third-Space Theory, in SITUATED LITERACIES, supra note
68, at 54, 56, 59-65 (prisons).
76. Mary R. Lea & Brian V. Street, Student Writing in Higher Education:An Academic
Literacies Approach, 23 STUD. HIGHER EDUC. 157 (1998).
77. Id. at 158.
78. See Berger, supra note 35, at 158; DeJarnatt, supra note 16, at 503.
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sounds like it is related to previous work on helping students move from
novice to expert.79
Lea and Street add a twist, however. Too commonly, academic literacy
practices are seen as one-sided because the students acquire the "codes
and conventions" of an academic discipline with those codes and
conventions being a given.s' However, Lea and Street view academic
literacy practices from both sides, including the students and their
literacy practices in the model.8 In doing so, they offer what they hope
is a more complex model of academic literacy practices and one that
shows academic literacy-learning to read and write in a given
discipline-as a matter of contest and struggle, rather than a simple
matter of acquiring a set of skills.8 2 To that end, they outline what
they call three main perspectives on, or models for, teaching students
literacy practices and, more specifically, teaching students to read and
write: (1) study skills, (2) academic socialization, and (3) academic
literacies."
The first perspective, study skills, is what most people think of when
they think of literacy. Under this perspective, literacy involves a set of
discrete skills.' Lea and Street call these skills "technical and
instrumental,""5 and they note that this model of literacy leads to a
focus on student deficits: students who possess these skills are well on
their ways to being successful writers, and students who lack them are
not." These skills, once acquired, are transferable to other contexts;
thus, the skills themselves are acontextual, or according to Lea and
Street, "atomised.8 7 They also note that because this model can be
crude in its application, writing teachers have tried to enlarge their
79. See Blasi, supra note 63, at 386-89. This notion is not entirely new. James Boyd
White describes legal literacy as follows:
[Lliteracy is not merely the capacity to understand the conceptual content of
writings and utterances, but the ability to participate fully in a set of social and
intellectual practices. It is not passive but active; not imitative but creative, for
participation in the speaking and writing of language is participation in the
activities it makes possible. Indeed literacy involves a perpetual remaking both
of language and of practice.
JAMES BOYD WHITE, The Invisible Discourse of the Law, in HERACLES' Bow: ESSAYS ON THE
RHETORIC AND POETICS OF THE LAw 60, 72 (1985).
80. Lea & Street, supra note 76, at 158.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 158, 172.
84. Id. at 158-59.
85. Id. at 159.
86. See id. at 172.
87. Id. at 158.
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focus to include "broader issues of learning and social context,"' and
these efforts at a broader perspective have led to the second perspective,
which they call the "academic socialisation" approach."
This second perspective, academic socialization, is also reasonably
familiar to professors in the legal writing community, at least since the
mid-1990s. 90 It is broader than the first perspective. Within this
perspective, literacy becomes not only a matter of skills but also the
social contexts within which those skills are employed. Thus, the
academic socialization perspective entails not only texts, but also
contexts and, in so doing, accounts more fully for what students must
learn as they enter a new discourse domain such as law. Another
literacy researcher, Roz Ivani6, distinguishes between the earlier skills
view of literacy, which she calls literacy "literacy (a)," and the academic
socialization view, which she calls literacy "literacy (b)."9' Noting that
the latter is more powerful, she states that "[literacy ... is not a
technology made up of a set of transferable cognitive skills, but a
constellation of practices which differ from one social setting to
another."92
In their discussion of the three models of literacy, Lea and Street point
out that these models are not exclusive or independent of each other, nor
do they exist in a linear frame of time-students acquire skills first, then
become socialized into a discourse.93 Rather, the broader second view
"encapsulates" the first view "so that the academic socialisation
perspective takes account of study skills but includes them in the
broader context of... acculturation processes."94
Although Lea and Street embrace a broader model of literacy, they
nevertheless note some shortcomings of the academic socialization model.
Of these, they see its incompleteness as its most important shortcom-
ing.95 In their view, learning to read and write in a specific discourse
entails more than matters of skill or socialization; rather, reading and
writing involve much deeper issues of language, discourse, epistemology,
88. Id. at 159.
89. Id. This was part of our effort in our earlier article. See Rideout & Ramsfield,
supra note 7, at 66.
90. See Rideout & Ramsfield, supra note 7, at 39 (citing Williams, supra note 12, at 1).
91. IVANI6, supra note 1, at 57-59.
92. Id. at 65.
93. Lea & Street, supra note 76, at 158.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 158-59.
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and identity.' To that end, they posit a third perspective on litera-
cy-what they call "academic literacy."
97
Within the academic literacy perspective, literacy is seen as a social
practice, as we suggested earlier in our discussion of the new literacy
studies.9 Viewed as a social practice, academic literacy thus reaches
the deeper issues mentioned above. Lea and Street describe this more
fully:
[Academic literacy] views student writing and learning as issues at the
level of epistemology and identities rather than skill or socialisation.
An academic literacies approach views the institutions in which
academic practices take place as constituted in, and as sites of,
discourse and power. It sees the literacy demands of the curriculum
as involving a variety of communicative practices, including genres,
fields and disciplines. From the student point of view a dominant
feature of academic literacy practices is the requirement to switch
practices between one setting and another, to deploy a repertoire of
linguistic practices appropriate to each setting, and to handle the social
meanings and identities that each evokes. 9
We agree with Lea and Street that our view of students' literacy-in
our case, how law students learn to read and write-should be equally
broad and deep. When we ask a student to learn to "write like a
lawyer," we are requesting an enormously complex undertaking. This
undertaking not only requires a full set of skills-whether linguistic or
cognitive-but also requires that students employ those skills in a
discourse that, to most of them, is wholly new and unfamiliar.
Furthermore, embedded within that discourse are complex practices
that emerge from the social and institutional context that we can
casually call "the law." These practices contain relationships of
epistemology, power, and authority that both guide and constrain what
students can say and write-whether they are making a simple
statement about what the relevant law is or whether they are applying
that statement of the law to make a legal argument. For legal writers
to do so, they must adopt not only a set of discourse practices specific to
the law, but also an epistemology and an identity specific to the law.
96. Id. at 159.
97. Id. at 158-59.
98. See supra text accompanying notes 68-75.
99. Lea & Street, supra note 76, at 159.
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B. Literacy and Identity
Of particular interest to us, then, is Lea and Street's observation that
the third perspective, academic literacy, involves questions about a
writer's identity. They explain:
This emphasis on identities and social meanings draws attention to
deep affective and ideological conflicts in such switching and use of the
linguistic repertoire. A student's personal identity-who am T--may
be challenged by the forms of writing required in different disciplines
... and students may feel threatened and resistant.'00
We intend to return to this issue of student identity shortly.
As mentioned earlier,1°' Roz Ivani6 distinguishes between literacy
as skills, literacy (a), and literacy as socialization, literacy (b)."~ In
discussing literacy (b), Ivani6 talks about literacy practices in the plural
because, like Lea and Street, she sees literacy as embedded in social
contexts.' s As she puts it, literacy practices are a subset of social
practices, and like social practices more generally, literacy practices vary
among the numerous social contexts in which we find ourselves.
14
Furthermore, these social contexts shape our literacy practices through
the values, beliefs, and power relations embedded within those
contexts." And because we find ourselves situated within multiple
social contexts that are not "hermetically sealed,"1°' we often find
ourselves engaged in multiple literacy practices, some which can even
conflict with each other.
Because the new literacy researchers emphasize that literacy practices
are shaped by the values, beliefs, and power relations in which they are
situated, researchers are able to make an important connection between
the literacy practices in which a writer engages and that writer's
identity. As Ivani6 states, becoming "more literate"-by which she
means extending one's literacy practices to a new context-is "in itself
an issue of identity."0 7 In moving beyond a "skills" view of literacy to
a more contextualized view, one in which literacy is seen less as
something to be acquired and more as a practice to be engaged in,
100. Id.
101. See supra text accompanying notes 91-92.
102. See IVANI6, supra note 1, at 57-59.
103. Id. at 65.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 66.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 70.
108. Id. at 69.
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these researchers are able to investigate the ways in which the
embedded values and beliefs of a discourse shape the identity of the
writer. This can happen when writers incorporate some of the values
and epistemologies of a new discourse into their own literacy practices,
or it can even happen when writers resist or struggle with some of the
values and epistemologies of a new discourse-an interesting phenome-
non that we intend to look at later. In their own investigations of
writers' identities, which are primarily in the context of academic
literacies, the new literacy researchers find both assimilation and
resistance.
In our view, this "view from within," law students present an excellent
example of writers who are caught between multiple literacy practices,
complete with the contest and struggle that Lea and Street describe
when explaining academic literacy. 9  Further, we believe that the
process of being socialized into legal discourse has important implica-
tions for the identity of a legal writer, as Ivani6 notes."' This identity,
initially forged in law school and then extending throughout a legal
writer's entire legal career, is an important part of what it means to
become literate in the law.
Furthermore, we believe most legal writing professors see signs of
their students struggling to acquire this discoursal identity. But finding
a way to analyze and understand this struggle is difficult. And in the
literature on legal writing as acquisition of skills-albeit complex and
sophisticated skills--questions of the writer's identity are necessarily
ignored. Before we turn to the identity of a legal writer, however, we
need to further examine the context in which legal writers write-the
language of the law and, in particular, some of the embedded values and
epistemologies legal language draws from its social context.
C. Language, Legal Epistemology, and Legal Persons
Although a number of researchers have approached law from the
perspective of language, the one who comes closest to the approach that
interests us is Elizabeth Mertz, who has assembled her ongoing research
into a treatise entitled The Language of Law School: Learning to "Think
Like a Lawyer.""' For Mertz, language is central to any study of legal
reasoning."2 She cites a long line of legal theorists who have agreed
with this premise, ranging from Edward Levi and John Austin to Ronald
109. See Lea & Street, supra note 76, at 159.
110. See IVANI, supra note 1, at 66.
111. MERTZ, supra note 2.
112. See id. at 3, 26.
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Dworkin, James Boyd White, Duncan Kennedy, and Patricia Wil-
liams."3 Mertz centers her own research on the ways language
operates in the law and in law school,"" and like the new literacy
theorists, she eschews structural views of language for a more socioling-
uistic model, insisting that language use be studied in particular social
contexts."5 Studying legal language in relation to its social contexts
and the values embedded within those contexts allows Mertz to look at
the values, power relations, and epistemologies embedded within legal
language and at the process of socialization that law students undergo
as they incorporate legal discourse into their own literacy practices."'
Mertz seems particularly interested in what lies behind the common
catchphrase, "thinking like a lawyer." She notes that although the
phrase is often used as a simple stand-in for a set of cognitive skills
common to lawyers and sought by law students, when viewed sociolin-
guistically, the phrase yields deeper meanings." 7
['Thinking like a lawyer"] has long been an established catchphrase
used by the legal profession (and those studying or writing about it) to
describe the essence of law school training. It represents, in a sense,
a distillation of indigenous ideology, a summary of how the process is
viewed from within. However, to unpack or analyze this ideology, we
find that we have to understand more than a mere acontextual outline
of cognitive processes. Instead, we must examine what it means to
read or talk like a lawyer, and this means that we are analyzing
metalinguistic norms and ideologies: we are looking at a new relation-
ship with language that is created for lawyers ... [E]mbedded in this
new relationship is a hidden epistemology."
Mertz uses the phrase "metalinguistic norms and ideologies" to refer to
the values, beliefs, and power relations described by the new literacy
researchers mentioned earlier, but of particular interest is her descrip-
tion of the legal epistemology that underlies legal language.
Mertz describes this legal epistemology in considerable detail as she
discusses the socialization of law students into legal discourse. She finds
that legal language and its underlying epistemology translates the social
113. Id. at 26.
114. Id. at 12.
115. Id. at 17.
116. Id. at 12.
117. Id. at 97-98.
118. Id. To her phrase we must examine what it means to read or talk like a lawyer,
we would quickly add or to write like a lawyer. Mertz concentrates on the traditional
Socratic classroom in her study and, thus, largely ignores the practice of legal writing. See
id. at 44-45.
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situations into more abstract terms. 9 The people in these social
situations are translated into roles-the most basic are the roles of
plaintiff and defendant-and their actions are translated into abstract
legal categories--for example, the categories of tort or breach of
contract. 20 The stories of these situations point toward fairly con-
strained results-of either guilty or not guilty, or of affirmed or
denied.121 And the complex social dramas of these stories are translat-
ed into the regimentation of legal institutions-the courts, legal
documents, and lawyers' talk.'22
A key presupposition of the legitimacy of those results is the untying
of the drama as legally translated from its usual social moorings, the
putative objectivity of the story once told in the apparently dispassion-
ate language of the law. As the people in the cases become parties (i.e.,
strategic actors on either side of a legal argument), they are stripped
of social position and specific context, located in a geography of legal
discourse and authority. Their gender, race, class, occupational, and
other identities become secondary to their ability to argue that they
have met various aspects of legal tests."
At the same time, Mertz finds a specificity to legal epistemology that,
somewhat incongruously, rests side-by-side with its abstraction.' 24
This specificity is equally tied to the dictates of legal process, however,
so its effect is also to translate any commonsense, everyday understand-
ing of a social situation into the medium of legal language.25
Ib connect each new conflict story with legal precedent, students must
focus on detailed aspects of the stories, if they are to categorize the new
facts as instances of general, legally specified types. For example, a
student might argue that a particular act or event in this new conflict
story constitutes a breach of contract because it is arguably the "same"
as an action or an event in a previous case where the courts found a
breach. Yet, this apparent concern for specificity wrenches detail from
its particular social and (nonlegal) narrative contexts in ways that can
obscure or erase the features of the story to which laypeople look when
reaching moral judgments."2





124. Id. at 133.
125. Id.
126. Id.
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Mertz thus finds that legal language and its underlying epistemology
have a double edge.'27 On the one hand, the fact that legal language
translates human conflict into abstract and objective categories has the
potential to, for example, erase some forms of prejudice.' When
context-rich social situations are translated into abstract legal catego-
ries, certain differences disappear, and justice will demand similar
outcomes for similarly situated social actors."2 On the other hand,
this erasing of social particulars can conceal additional underlying moral
dimensions, ones that may be important for the larger meaning of the
social conflict under consideration but not for its legal meaning.'3 0 In
addition, the double-edged move back and forth from legally abstract to
legally concrete may not in itself be ideologically neutral and may mask
hidden and damaging cultural assumptions. 3 '
Mertz pays particular attention to the act of legal reading, finding that
legal language exerts an early but powerful effect on law students by
reorienting their relationship to language and the ways it represents
social reality."' She finds they, are retrained as readers so that when
encountering stories of conflict in legal cases, they replace older
strategies of interpretation and understanding-for example, plot,
character, or underlying theme-with new ones.'33 In this retraining,
students are pulled away from referential approaches to meaning,
"which treat the text as transparent and view its core meaning as its
referential content," and into approaches that focus on the relationship
between textual and legal authority." This layering of pragmatic
approaches creates a new lineage for understanding legal texts: "[Tihe
line of previous cases and other legal texts that a court (or lawyers, or
law students) can cite as authorities in deciding the case at hand, and
the procedural lineage of the case, traceable through opinions of lower
courts, the record in the case, and so forth.""' In the process of
mastering legal reading, law students also master an underlying
epistemology that constrains their understanding of language and text,
focusing on proofs that rely upon intricate layers of intertextual
127. Id.
128. Id. at 213.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 213-14,
132. See id. at 43-44.
133. See id.
134. Id. at 94.
135. Id.
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authority and learning to blind themselves to other more "natural"
social, cultural, and political interpretations of the underlying conffict.
The effect of this legal epistemology on law students, as they are
socialized into it, can be alienating. Mertz notes that "[t]o successfully
master this discourse, students must be able to speak in an T that is not
their own self, to adapt their position to the exigencies of legal lan-
guage."3' The experience can be decentering. Mertz describes it as
an "unmooring of the self from its usual coordinates" 13 7 and notes that
this unmooring results in a different speaking "I," a new persona "carved
and crafted by the demands of legal discourse.""
Mertz's research offers, in our view, the most comprehensive study to
date of the relationship between legal language and its embedded values,
epistemologies, and power relations-the relationship that the new
literacy researchers have examined more generally in academic contexts.
We are especially drawn to her focus on the process of "becoming a legal
person"'39 and her notion of the decentering or unmooring that can
accompany the development of a new persona.4
While Mertz concentrates on the acts of reading and talking,14 ' we
would like to concentrate on the act of writing in the law. As mentioned
earlier, we believe most legal writing professors encounter some form of
this decentering in their classes, and in our view, the development of a
legal writer's identity is an important part of the education of a law
student. 142
Mertz observes that in entering the world of legal discourse, law
students must learn to "speak in an T that is not their own self." 4 3
In entering the world of written legal discourse, a student must also
acquire a new identity, a legal writer's self. But the concept of a writer's
self is, as we have discovered, a complex one. To unpack this, we turn
again to the work of Roz Ivani6, one of the new literacy researchers.
D. Writing and Identity
For Ivani6, working with writers who are entering a new discourse
means working with issues of identity.' She explains that her
136. Id. at 135.
137. Id. at 137.
138. Id. at 136.
139. See id. at 97.
140. Id. at 136-37.
141. See, e.g., id. at 97.
142. See supra notes 26-48 and accompanying text.
143. Mertz, supra note 2, at 135.
144. See IVANi6, supra note 1, at 5.
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interest in writing and identity arose out of practical experience, not
theoretical concerns."4 In her own teaching, she began working with
"mature" writers-that is, writers who were returning to higher
education after the age of twenty-five.146  She noticed that, although
many of these students had regular qualifications for higher education
and had simply postponed entering the university, when they returned
to school and began to undertake academic writing assignments, the
writing did not seem to "come naturally" to them.'47 The experience
of these students contrasted sharply with that of traditional undergradu-
ates who, at the age of eighteen, had simply gone on to university life
and continued writing academic essays.'
As Ivani6 began to examine the experiences of her students more
closely, she noted that traditional undergraduates had never left the
world of academic literacy, but rather had experienced a steady
apprenticeship that continued unbroken from secondary schooling into
the university.'49 The path of the "mature" writers, however, had been
broken. 5 ' The question was: what was it about this disruption that
made the reentry of these students into academic writing difficult? In
speaking with them, IvaniZ found that these writers repeatedly brought
up issues of identity.
151
Despite the practical bent of Ivani 's initial interest in a writer's
identity, her interest also develops logically out of her work as a new
literacy researcher. Under a definition of literacy as skills-literacy (a),
defined above 5 2-- her target group of "mature" writers would be seen
as deficient in skills and thus would need assistance in remedying these
deficiencies by acquiring the missing skills. However, this kind of
assistance would not fully address the discomfort of these students.
Alternatively, literacy (b)-literacy as socialization-seemed to address
these discomforts. These students were writing in a context that, if not
wholly new, was sufficiently unfamiliar to them so that they had
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 5-6. Some of these returning students had more marginal qualifications
and had even been labeled deficient in literacy skills, but most proved these "skills" labels
mistaken as they gradually entered into academic literacy. Id. Their struggles to enter




151. Id. at 6. In looking at additional research with this group of "mature" writers,
Ivani6 discovered other researchers had also found that issues of identity were important
for these writers. See id. at 6-8.
152. See supra text accompanying note 91.
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difficulty adjusting to it. And those difficulties went beyond mere skills
to something much deeper. As Ivani6 found when formally interviewing
them, for many of these students, writing in a new context-that is,
engaging in a new literacy practice-was difficult and to some extent
alienating." To the extent that the "self with which these writers
wrote was a product of a specific context, writing in a new context
required a different sense of self.
Most law students, in our view, experience similar issues of identity.
Some law students enter law school straight from undergraduate
studies, and some enter after doing something else-sometimes after
pursuing a whole career. However, all students seem like they must
make an adjustment to the writing tasks they face in law school and
beyond. Most legal writing programs make efforts to assist with that
adjustment, but usually those efforts take the form of helping law
students acquire the essential skills that they will need to be successful
legal writers (and readers). The focus is at the level of literacy (a). The
deeper issues are more difficult to address, even though the literature on
legal writing has acknowledged for some time that becoming a legal
writer is a process of socialization, as well as a process of acquiring new
skills.'5 Like Ivani6, we assert that the process of being socialized
into legal writing entails issues of identity. But how do we approach
such a seemingly nebulous concept? Ivanik suggests that the best way
is to look at the identity of the writer as a social identity. 55
Ivani6 is not the first to view writing in social terms. In American
composition studies in the 1980s, Kenneth Bruffee used the metaphor of
writing as "conversation" to develop a social view of writing,'56 and
Lester Faigley built a theory of writing around a social view.' 7
Additionally, we suggested a social view to the legal writing community
a few years later." But Ivani6 specifically built a model of the
writer's identity around social models, drawing upon recent work in
social science and social identity theory.'59 These researchers focused
153. IVANIO, supra note 1, at 5.
154. Williams, supra note 12, at 2,9-13. Williams's article was perhaps the beginning
of this recognition.
155. IVANI6, supra note 1, at 11-12.
156. Kenneth A. Bruffee, Social Construction, Language, and the Authority of
Knowledge: A Bibliographical Essay, 48 C. ENG. 773, 777 (1986).
157. Lester Faigley, Competing Theories of Process: A Critique and a Proposal, 48 C.
ENG. 527, 528, 534-39 (1986).
158. Rideout & Ramsfield, supra note 7, at 56-61.
159. IVANI6, supra note 1, at 11-12.
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on the ways individuals define themselves socially, in reference to their
positions in social situations."
Somewhat paradoxically, taking the "view from within" requires a
social perspective. Because individuals are generally situated in several
social settings at any given time, these researchers postulate not a
unitary self, but a multiplicity of selves forged through an interaction
with the multiple settings and roles of modern life."6' In addition,
because these situations can change, these researchers uniformly dismiss
the notion of a fixed self, instead positing a self that changes.'62
Anthony Giddens calls this the "'reflexive project of the self.'""
Ivani6 summarizes the characteristics of a social view of identity as one
that is "multiple, historically situated, negotiable, and changing over the
lifespan.1 6
4
In addition, she notes that more recent researchers on social identity
have turned to discourse as the medium lying between socially construct-
ed identities and the contexts that exert shaping influences on those
identities. 1" This mediating link is important because, to the extent
that discourses are shaped culturally and ideologically (and for most
social scientists and new literacy researchers, discourses are), this link
offers a model for understanding the ways in which the identities people
take on are also shaped culturally and ideologically. This link is also
valuable for understanding what happens when people enter into new
discourses-for example, the law. In doing so, they also enter into new
identities.
Finally, Ivani6 finishes her model of a writer's identity by turning to
the work of the social theorist Erving Goffman,'" who developed a
dramaturgical model for social identity.167 Ivani6 notes that Goffman
looked at the relationship between identity and language and, in so
doing, developed a model in which identity could be discussed in terms
of its several different aspects." Furthermore, Goffman's model
denied an essentialist view of the self; under his dramaturgical model,
160. Id. at 14-15.
161. See, e.g., id. at 12.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 16 (quoting ANTHONY GIDDENS, MODERNITY AND SELF-IDENTITY: SELF AND
SOCIETY IN THE LATE MODERN AGE 9 (1991)).
164. Id. at 19.
165. Id. at 17.
166. Id. at 19.
167. See ERVING GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE (1973).
168. IVANI(, supra note 1, at 21.
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identity is a matter of performance, resulting in a status or position-or
"character," metaphorically speaking-but not a material thing.16 9
Although she notes some shortcomings of Goffman's model, Ivani6
nevertheless finds it useful and adaptable to her own model of a writer's
identity.7' Important to Ivani6 are Goffman's notions of social identity
having different aspects, and those aspects being tied to language
use.171 Mapping Goffman's model onto writing, Ivani6 finds that the
identity of any individual writer comprises three aspects, plus a fourth
aspect that lies beyond the identities of any individual writer.'7 2 She
finds that when people talk about identity and writing, they refer to one
of these four aspects. 7 '
The three aspects of an individual writer's identity are as follows: (1)
the autobiographical self, (2) the discoursal self, and (3) the self as
author. 4 These are aspects of the social identity of real writers
writing particular texts.'75 In addition, Ivani6 notes that people talk
about a fourth identity, possibilities for self-hood, which is not an aspect
of any individual writer's identity, but rather the set of positions or
possibilities available to any writer in a given social context. 17 6 The
first three aspects of a writer's self do not, of course, have any material
or cognitive presence; they are ways of thinking and talking about a
writer's identity. 77 But in Ivani 's view, they are valuable and useful
ways of talking about writers, especially writers who are acquiring new
literacy practices. 78  These aspects of a writer's self are also not
wholly discrete or distinct from each other; rather, they interact with
each other.79 And most importantly, they also interact with the
fourth aspect, possibilities for self-hood, in a reciprocal fashion so that
the three aspects of an individual writer's identity are both shaped by,
and in turn shape, the possibilities for self-hood."s  Each aspect
deserves further discussion.
169. Id. (citing GOFFMAN, supra note 167, at 65-66).
170. Id. at 22-23. For a discussion of Voice in legal writing that is based on this model,
see J. Christopher Rideout, Voice, Self, and Persona in Legal Writing, 15 J. LEGAL WRITING
INST. 67 (2009).
171. IVANI6, supra note 1, at 23-24.
172. Id. at 24.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 23.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 23, 27.
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The autobiographical self is the commonsensical notion of the self-the
self that people think they just "have."18' It feels like it is a priori to
any act of writing: the self that a writer brings to the writing task from
other life experiences or the self that sets out to produce the writing.12
It is, however, a constructed self and not an essential or fixed self.'"'
Although it sounds like a "self," it is actually a "self-portrait," composed
from (or "representing") the sum total of a person's life experiences.'
Ivani6 notes that
Itihe term "autobiographical self" emphasizes the fact that this aspect
of identity is associated with a writer's sense of their roots, of where
they are coming from, and that this identity they bring with them to
writing is itself socially constructed and constantly changing as a
consequence of their developing life-historyl"
For most people, the autobiographical self is unproblematic-a given.
Thus, it can feel like a "centering" aspect of the self for writers who are
struggling. The autobiographical self is the self that we "feel" we are.
But it is a construct.
Perhaps the idea of co-authorship offers a good illustration of the
constructed nature of the autobiographical self. We (the Authors) feel
that we have brought our "selves" to the task of writing this Article, as
the "Authors" (a seemingly unitary authorial concept), but we can attest
that in the other ways in which we represent ourselves socially, we are
very different persons.
The discoursal self is the "self' in the text-or, rather, the impression
of the self that any given text conveys.'8s When we read a text, we get
an impression of a self that is the writer in the text. In IvaniS's terms,
this aspect of a writer's identity is clearly a construct shaped by the
context or discourse within which the writer is writing, producing a
specific text."7 She calls this aspect of the writer's self "discoursal"
because "it is constructed through the discourse characteristics of a text,
which relate to values, beliefs, and power relations in the social context
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This discoursal self lacks the seeming permanence of the autobio-
graphical self because it is tied to the text."8 9 It vanishes in the
absence of the text, except insofar as the production of any text and the
accompanying discoursal self in that text become part of a writer's life
history and, thus, a piece of the autobiographical self. In our view, the
successful construction of a convincing discoursal self is one of the
primary challenges for writers entering a new discourse or adopting a
new literacy practice. Thus, one of the great challenges for emerging
legal writers is to successfully construct this legal discoursal self.
Learning to "write like a lawyer" means learning how to remake part of
one's discoursal self into a self shaped, in part, by the discoursal
conventions of the law.
The "self as author" seems to be a more constrained aspect of a
writer's identity, something close to the authorial presence that an
author has. Ivani6 uses the concept of the self as author to illustrate
how the different aspects of a writer's identity are interrelated.' 9 For
example, the self as author is related to the autobiographical self to the
extent that the writer has something to say and the confidence to say
it.191 The self as author is related to the discoursal self insofar as the
self in the text seems authoritative as an author.' 92 The self as author
contributes to a writer's "voice" as the part of a writer's voice that has
a position to assert, or as values and beliefs that inform the voice. 93
As an example of the self as author, we have regularly asserted in this
Article things that we believe are accurate statements about the nature
of writing and legal writing. In doing so, we have stepped forward with
a direct authorial presence."9  That is one example of the self as
author.
As we mentioned above, 98 the fourth aspect, the possibilities for self-
hood, is not a part of the identity of a writer, but rather lies "outside"
the writer in the social context within which the writer is writing.1
96
The possibilities for self-hood are potential discoursal identities available
to writers in given social contexts and, thus, constrained by those social
contexts and the given epistemologies and values of those contexts.
197
189. Id.




194. Authorial presence emerges in other ways as well, such as the successful
observance of important formal conventions for writing a particular type of text.
195. See supra text accompanying note 126.
196. IVANIO, supra note 1, at 27.
197. Id.
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They do not just "belong" to particular individuals.19 Part of what a
legal writing classroom (and law school more generally) does, in terms
of literacy and writers' identities, is move students toward the potential
positions they can occupy as legal writers-positions that the discourse
of law privileges as being "legal." Some classrooms, of course, move
students toward these positions more successfully than others, and
individual students position themselves discoursally within these
possibilities with greater or lesser amounts of ease or resistance.
We should note that Ivani6 uses the term possibilities for self-hood
quite deliberately and as a compromise between other terms.' She
avoids the more common term subject positions, a term that in her view
suggests overly unitary and coherent social identities.2' Nevertheless,
the term possibilities also makes her uneasy because it implies an overly
optimistic and unlimited set of discoursal positions when, in fact, those
positions are socially constrained."' After some discussion about this
key term, we have decided on our own compromise term, positions and
possibilities, finding it important to include the constraining sense of the
word positions. For the remainder of the Article, we will substitute for
Ivani6's possibilities for self-hood the phrase positions and possibilities.
To summarize, a writer's identity comprises these aspects:
"Inside" the writer:
Autobiographical Self-
What a writer regards as "my identity," although untrace-
able in the piece of writing; the life history that stands
prior to the act of writing.
Discoursal Self-
That part of a writer's identity for which the piece of
writing does offer evidence, although the writing itself
"constructs" this aspect of the writer's self.
Self as Author-
The authorial presence in a piece of writing, evidenced by




201. Id. at 28.
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The prototypical positions available within any given
context for writing; these positions are in turn inscribed by
the values, epistemologies, and power relations of that
context.
III. THE VIEW FROM WITHIN: LEGAL WRITING AND IDENTITY
This model for the discoursal identity of a writer, when mapped onto
legal writing, raises several important questions. First, what does it
mean, in terms of a legal writer's identity, to say a writer is being
socialized into legal discourse, and how is it useful to think of this
process in terms of the identity of a legal writer? Second, what does this
mean for our pedagogical practices as teachers of legal writing, and can
it help us better understand some of the issues we face when we teach?
Finally, what about the issue of change and reform? If we view a legal
writer's self as discoursally constructed-as to some extent a product of
the positions and possibilities available through legal discourse-must
that self always remain passive, always positioned in the same way by
legal discourse? Can that positioning, and the form and style of legal
writing it produces, never change?
A. Writing Like a Lawyer: The Discoursal Self
At the beginning of this Article, we used the phrase writing like a
lawyer, a phrase that, to us, is more telling than it appears to be. For
indeed, when any of us writes a document for a legal setting, and
especially if we are novices to that setting, we are writing "like" a
lawyer, constructing an identity out of the positions and possibilities
available to lawyers as they write. That is, when we write like a lawyer,
we are not only adopting the conventions of legal prose-conventions
that range from IRAC in its various forms to Bluebook or ALWD formats
for citation-but we are also constructing a legal self.
Writing legal prose entails a good deal of insider knowledge about
legal discourse, about the analytic structures for legal reasoning, about
the analogical relationship between the existing body of law and the fact
situations of new cases, about how to construct legal arguments and
what constitutes valid methodologies of proof in those arguments. This
insider knowledge is complex, detailed, both context- and content-
specific, and almost impossible to impart successfully in a decontextual-
ized and generic form. To know it is to acquire membership in the
discourse community that we speak of, loosely, as legal. And to have
membership in that discourse community is to have an identity in it.
[Vol. 61736
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That is part of what it means to be a legal writer, and that identity is,
in our view, best described as discoursal. Writing like a lawyer means
constructing the discoursal self of a lawyer.
For this reason, of the four aspects of a writer's identity that Ivani6
offers, we suggest teachers of legal writing primarily focus on the
discoursal self-that part of a legal writer's identity "constructed" by
legal writing itself. It is most directly in terms of the discoursal self that
a writer is socialized into legal writing. And in our view, it is in terms
of the discoursal self that most people experience the sometimes
profound change-not only in how they think, but in who they are-that
seems to occur when they learn to write like a lawyer.
We summarized some of the features of legal discourse above when
discussing Mertz's work.2"2 These features map onto the identity of a
legal writer. Learning legal writing is learning a new epistemology-a
new way of looking at the world. That epistemology can be alien to
novice legal writers. It can strip storytelling of some of its familiar
features, eliminating some concrete details as irrelevant and substituting
legal categories and goals for other, more traditional narrative struc-
tures. It can marginalize conventional moral or social moorings and
bury or render invisible ideological considerations. And most curiously,
it can render ways of looking at the world as both abstract and concrete,
but in a double-edged combination that defies ordinary understandings
of the world and reduces human beings to legal actors situated within
narrow frameworks of legal argument. These features become not only
part of the legal writing, but also part of the legal writer.
The notion of a discoursal self is important, in our view, because it is
through the discoursal self that we can best understand how the features
of legal discourse, mentioned briefly above, get inscribed onto the
identity of a legal writer. Learning to write like a lawyer is much more
than simply taking on a role. It is taking on a different identity, one
inscribed with ways of understanding the world that are constrained by
the positions and possibilities available within the discourse of the law.
Given the specialized nature of this discourse, law students feel that to
become legal writers, they must learn new ways of thinking, new ways
of seeing the world, and new ways of talking and writing about it. They
feel like they are changing as a person. And they are right.
Learning to write like a lawyer means also learning a new literacy
practice-the complex and specialized literacy practice of lawyers. But
learning this new literacy practice of legal writing entails learning the
discourse practices and conventions of the law, and those practices, in
202. See supra text accompanying notes 111-43.
2010] 737
HeinOnline  -- 61 Mercer L. Rev. 737 2009-2010
MERCER LAW REVIEW
turn, form the identity of a legal writer. Legal writing as a discipline,
like other writing disciplines, focuses primarily on legal texts-legal
memoranda, briefs, pleadings, and other similar documents. And to a
lesser extent, it focuses on the production of legal texts-the processes
a legal writer undertakes. We suggest that in future research, legal
writing also include considerations of a legal writer's identity, partly
because this is an important part of the psychology of constructing one's
self as a legal writer and partly because, in the ways suggested above,
it is through the construction of the discoursal self of a legal writer that
we as legal writing professors can understand more practically what it
means for legal writers to socialize into legal discourse. To our
knowledge, this aspect of legal writing has been largely ignored. We
regard it as an important part of what we teach, especially when we are
teaching first-year law students.
B. Writing Like a Lawyer: Other Aspects of a Legal Writer's Identity
Although we suggest that the discoursal self of a legal writer and its
construction may be of most interest in understanding what it means to
become a legal writer, the other aspects of a writer's identity are
important to legal writing as well. The authoritativeness of the legal
writer-the self as author, for example-is something built into most
legal writing programs. Law students are taught to write objective-
ly203 and to avoid forms of personal expression in their legal writing.
They learn other forms of authoritativeness in legal prose, ranging from
carefully employing highly codified forms of legal citation to learning
how to back up any statement with legal authority, thus avoiding being
conclusory. At the level of legal style, some research, but not enough,
has been done on the ways in which the demand for an objective voice
and its anonymous authority translate into stylistic forms in legal prose,
including the overuse of nominalizations or passive voice .20 Most
legal writing programs caution students about the stylistic effects of
overusing these constructions, but seldom is the advice given in the
context of discussing how to find an authoritative voice as a legal writer.
In moving students toward adopting a more objective, authoritative
legal persona for their writing, most legal writing programs also seem
to overlook the autobiographical self of the writer. Other, expressivist-
based forms of writing instruction lend themselves more readily to an
expressive form of writing that gives greater voice and prominence to the
203. In most legal writing programs, the first form of writing taught is objective
writing, usually in the form of a legal memorandum.
204. See JOSEPH M. WILLIAMS, STYLE: LESSONS IN CLARITY AND GRACE, 38-43, 60-73
(2007).
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autobiographical self,2 5 but this form of writing is largely inappropri-
ate for formal legal writing.2' Nevertheless, the autobiographical self
is very much part of the discoursal identity of any legal writer, whether
law student or legal practitioner. Although legal writers assume a legal
persona when they "write like a lawyer," this persona is not their only
identity, nor is it by any means the sum total of the life history of any
individual who writes for the law. Everyone has a sense of self that
stands a priori to the self that sits down to a writing task. When legal
writing teachers talk with students in class or sit down with students in
a writing conference, they encounter to varying degrees this autobio-
graphical self that stands "behind" the writing.
It is, in our view, precisely this a priori nature of the autobiographical
self that can lead to conflict in legal writing, especially for first- or
second-year students who are learning to write like lawyers. In
constructing a discoursal self-the self that writes (and sounds) like a
lawyer-law students must largely choose from the positions and
possibilities available to them in legal discourse, but almost never are
those available positions and possibilities ones that match law students'
autobiographical identities.2 7 This accommodation of the autobio-
graphical self to the demands of the discourse of the law can be difficult
and even alienating. Novice legal writers in particular may feel that it
is not "them" writing for the law, or even that "they" are not capable of
doing it. When we speak to our students on a more personal level,
usually in writing conferences, we often hear this discomfort in the way
law students talk about themselves. They have a sense of their "real"
self that is trying to accommodate a new way of thinking and writing
about the world through the law. In other words, their autobiographical
self is trying to position itself within legal discourse.
205. See PETER ELBOW, WRITING WITH POWER: TECHNIQUES FOR MASTERING THE
WRITING PROCESS 283--85 (1981).
206. Some, however, have argued for more expressive writing in law school. See, e.g.,
James R. Elkins, Writing Our Lives: Making Introspective Writing a Part of Legal
Education, 29 WILLAME TE L. REV. 45 (1993); Andrea McArdle, Teaching Writing in
Clinical, Lawyering, and Legal Writing Courses: Negotiating Professional and Personal
Voice, 12 CLINICAL L. REV. 501 (2006).
207. Nor are these discoursal selves, we would submit, matches for more experienced
legal writers who are simply more comfortable with the construction of a discoursal
identity in the law. For more experienced writers, what began as a constructed discoursal
self for legal writing has become, over time, more a part of their autobiographical self as
well to some extent.
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C. Writing Like a Lawyer: The Discoursal View and Teaching
Ivani6 notes that when students learn academic writing, at least at
the university level, they often experience resistance to the discourse
they are asked to adopt."8  Thus, their construction of a writer's
identity, in academic contexts, is a process of struggle and negotiation
with the dominant discourses of the university and with the epistemolog-
ies and ideologies embedded within those discourses.2 9 In our view,
the same is true of students when they learn legal writing. Learning to
write like a lawyer is not only a matter of acquiring new skills for
putting arguments into the forms and conventions of legal discourse. It
is also a process of constructing a discoursal identity, and this process
entails not only accommodation, but also resistance, struggle, and
negotiation. We sense this when we show our students a basic key
discourse move in legal prose-for example, avoiding writing a conclus-
ory legal statement. The move seems simple and basic to us, and as
teachers we usually have pedagogical strategies for illustrating it, but
we nevertheless often see our students struggle with it at first. Their
struggle is partly with the textual form of the discourse move, but it is
also partly with the shift in identity the move requires-a new way of
viewing the story behind any legal case and a view that may contradict
older, more familiar ways the student, in his or her autobiographical
sense, would have understood that story. Learning to write like a
lawyer is a challenge not only to the repertoire of a student's discourse
moves, but also to a student's identity. The struggle of the autobio-
graphical self to accommodate new positions and possibilities is the site
for this challenge.
In part, legal writers may experience this accommodation and struggle
through their mental encounter with a legal reader.210 In trying to
adapt to and accommodate legal conventions, or in the struggle with
these conventions, legal writers may primarily have in mind the
expectations of their legal readers. These expectations are probably
doubled in the case of law students enrolled in legal writing courses. As
teachers, we helpfully (or so we think) advise students to write for their
audience, usually a fictive law partner or judge. In doing so, we force
them to confront a reader situated directly within legal discourse and to
make countless decisions about how to write in a way that will persuade
and move that reader. At the same time, they write to us in our
208. IVANIO, supra note 1, at 13.
209. Id.
210. See id. at 244-45.
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capacities as teachers and evaluators, readers who will probably
evaluate their writing even more carefully and strictly for its ability to
successfully present itself as convincing legal prose.
This situation is complex. As legal writing teachers, we would do well
to remember that, among other things, when we put our students into
this discoursal community, we ask them to construct an identity that
requires accommodation of the available positions and possibilities and,
in most cases, negotiation between who students feel they "really" are
and who they must become, or construct, as legal writers. And because
our role as teachers and evaluators may intensify the demands students
feel as they undertake this negotiation, we should remember that when
we ask them to write for their audience, we ask them to undertake a
very complex social process of negotiating an identity from among the
various aspects of their self as a writer. This can too easily be glossed
over, especially when we give our students a writing assignment with a
well-specified rhetorical setting and audience. However helpful in other
ways, this in itself can heighten their struggle to forge a legal identity
out of which they can complete the writing assignment.
Legal writing teachers can use the concept of a discoursal identity to
understand and help their students in other ways. For example,
Elizabeth Mertz mentions the abstractness of legal discourse and the
way it unmoors stories from their more familiar underpinnings.211
Legal writing teachers are in an excellent pedagogical position to help
students adjust to this feature of legal discourse by providing rich
contexts for the legal problems they assign and by looking for opportuni-
ties to mitigate the ways broader social or moral questions can become
marginalized. One way would be to assign different types of writing
tasks that lead to the construction of different discoursal identities. In
doing so, students could develop more self-awareness about what they
are undergoing as they learn to write like a lawyer and learn more about
themselves as writers. 2 Elizabeth Fajans and Mary R. Falk similarly
advise that we teach our students to think more critically about the
law.21 Their advice about teaching law students legal reading applies
equally well to legal writing and the construction of identity.
If we view legal writing in terms of discoursal identities, we might also
better understand writers who are struggling or even "failing." Too often
we view these writers in terms of the skills they lack or are failing to
211. MERTZ, supra note 2, at 137.
212. We have, for example, sometimes asked beginning law students to write about a
fact situation as a journalist first and then as a legal practitioner.
213. Elizabeth Fajans & Mary R. Falk, Against the Tyranny of Paraphrase: Talking
Back to Texts, 78 CoRNELL L. REV. 163, 193 (1993).
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acquire. But those skills (legal literacy (a)) are part of a very complex
set of practices of legal literacy (legal literacy (b)), and acquiring the
identity of a legal writer-that is, finding ways the literacy practices of
the law can be inscribed on the discoursal self-is a key to acquiring full
legal literacy and, thus, mastering those skills. If we focus only on the
skills, our efforts may be incomplete, and we may fail to understand the
complex negotiation of identity that accompanies any effort to successful-
ly acquire the skills. Even worse, in focusing on the skills alone, we may
fail to see that when law students fail as legal writers, part of their
failure may result from our own failure to help them position themselves
properly within the discourse of the law. If acquiring the identity of a
legal writer entails negotiation and struggle between these aspects of the
writer's self, then we would be better teachers if we looked for ways to
help our students through that negotiation.
D. Writing Like a Lawyer: The Discoursal View and Change
Finally, viewing legal writing in terms of discoursal identities raises
the question of change, which is important but difficult. We agree with
the view that learning to write like a lawyer involves construction of a
discoursal identity. The discoursal identity is constructed from among
the positions and possibilities available within the discourse of the law,
and the construction entails accommodation and, to greater or lesser
extents, negotiation and perhaps resistance on the part of the writer.
Viewing the identity of a legal writer as comprising different as-
pects-the autobiographical self, the discoursal self, and the self as
author-is a model we find very helpful in understanding this process.
Such a model may also sound overly deterministic, but Roz Ivani6
emphasizes that it is not, noting its constructionist nature. 4 "[Ilden-
tity is not socially determined but socially constructed. This means that
the possibilities for the self are not fixed, but open to contestation and
change."215 Ivani6 does not make this statement naively, and she
acknowledges that dominant or privileged discourses like the law are
powerful and emerge from privileged ideological positions that can exert
great influence over discoursal representations of the self.216 She also
acknowledges that individuals may not be positioned to exert change in
a discourse's practices.217 Nevertheless, she points to the fact that
change in discourses and their available positions and possibilities does
214. IVANI6, supra note 1, at 12.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 13.
217. Id. at 28.
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occur and is motivated by "[cilashes between writers' autobiographical
identities and institutionally supported subject positions."21
We, for example, as the two individuals writing this Article, have had
considerable discussion about the place of "change" in legal discourse
and its relationship to a legal writer's discoursal identity. We both agree
that the concept is important to considerations of any writer's identity,
including a legal writer's. But we may have slightly different views of
its efficacy.
Certainly, to be a successful legal writer, one must sound like a legal
writer and write like one. In a discourse as heavily conventionalized as
the law, this is crucial. To do otherwise is to be something other than
a legal writer. Thus, our job as teachers of legal writing is to guide our
students toward acquiring the conventions and practices we call legal
writing. We argue in this Article, and believe, that doing so entails
constructing the identity of a legal writer as well.
At the same time, we do not deny the role of negotiation and
resistance in the model of discoursal identity. We see it in our own
students every semester and believe that, over time, those individual
acts of resistance may credibly add up to larger changes within legal
discourse. Sometimes those larger changes are incremental and track
other social changes in the culture at large, and sometimes they are
politically motivated and more overt. The possibilities are intriguing.
Although we can disagree over some of the finer points regarding
change and legal discourse, we can easily point to two examples of it in
recent years. The first is the increasing acceptance of what is usually
called the plain language movement.219 Thirty years ago, despite Carl
Felsenfeld and Alan Siegel's early treatise,220 the movement had had
little influence on legal discourse and was not taught in law schools.
Plain language drafting was rarely seen before 1980.221 Today it is
widely taught and practiced. Although the movement had its origins as
a consumer movement,222 we think it also was motivated by social and
demographic changes within the legal profession. As the legal profession
grew and as the demographic character of those in it changed, so did its
language. Those changes, at the individual level, no doubt occurred as
218. Id.
219. See, e.g., Joseph Kimble, Writing for Dollars, Writing to Please, 6 SCRIBES J. LEGAL
WRITING 1 (1996-1997); Wayne Schiess, What Plain English Really Is, 9 SCRIBES J. LEGAL
WRITING 43 (2003-2004).
220. CARL FELSENFELD & ALAN SIEGEL, WRITING CONTRACTS IN PLAIN ENGLISH (1981).
221. For a possible turning point, see Irwin Alterman, Plain and Accurate Style in
Lawsuit Papers, 2 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 243, 246-49 (1984).
222. See FELSENFELD & SIEGEL, supra note 220, at 230-31.
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legal writers began to "write like lawyers"-that is, began to construct
discoursal identities-but felt some resistance to, for example, adopting
archaic legalisms in their writing.
Another example of change, somewhat more recent, is the movement
toward narrative legal scholarship." Again, we can see how this
change had its origins at the individual level, as an act of resistance
against the dominant discourse of legal scholarship. To get their voices
heard, some scholars had to find a way around traditional modes of
scholarly writing. In this case, the change occurred as a way of more
directly accommodating the expression of the "real" self or what we
would call the autobiographical self. It resulted in a conscious and
deliberate shift in the discoursal identity of its authors.
IV. CONCLUSION
We argued in an earlier article for a social view of legal writing,2"
and now we have extended that view to include identity. For us, this
inclusion is important. Learning to write like a lawyer means acquiring
a new discoursal identity-one positioned within legal contexts and, in
many ways, shaped by those contexts. In our view, this takes legal
writing well beyond questions of legal skills. And to the extent that
learning to write like a lawyer means mastering the conventions of legal
discourse, we argue that those conventions become not only part of the
text, but also part of the writer.
This means legal writing classrooms, as we have long known, are an
important part of legal education in that the transformation of new law
students into lawyers-insofar as it is a discoursal transforma-
tion-takes place as much in legal writing classrooms as it does in other
law school classrooms, but perhaps more explicitly so. It also means
that legal writing professors need to be aware of what they ask of their
students when they ask them to write like a lawyer-the construction
of a new identity-and they should understand that some of the struggle
or resistance they see in their students is part of the process of becoming
a lawyer. We hope the discoursal model for identity offered in this
Article helps with that understanding and presents to others a way of
talking about the relationship between legal writers and the contexts
within which we ask them to write.
223. See, e.g., PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 3 (1991);
Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others:A Plea for Narrative, 87 MICH.
L. REv. 2411, 2415 (1989) (describing narrative legal scholarship as a structure which can
offer "respite from the linear, coercive discourse" of legal writing).
224. Rideout & Ramsfield, supra note 7.
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Finally, we hope this Article can trigger a conversation about the
question of change in legal discourse. As teachers of legal writing, we
are all positioned somewhere between the conventions of legal discourse,
which we are obligated to teach, and our reformist sense of what lies
both behind and beyond those conventions. Perhaps, as we look within,
that conversation will change not only some of the conventions of the
discourse and our practices in teaching it, but who we are as well.
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